Richard McCormick, "Some Neglected Aspects of Moral Responsibility for Health," reprinted in How Brave a New World?

            The public is increasingly becoming a partner in discussions of health and healthcare delivery. That is as it should be. But too often these discussions confine themselves to the neon problems of abortion, euthanasia, suicide, genetic screening and manipulation, allocation of scarce resources, etc., as if an answer to these very difficult problems exhausted the notion of moral responsibility for health. We are not likely to neglect or to forget such problems.

Furthermore, there are other general aspects of the question of responsibility for health that we are not likely to neglect. One can list them quickly and easily, as one rises with the late Mayor Richard Daley and his beloved Chicago to "higher and higher platitudes." Yes, there is an obligation to promote health. Yes, there is an obligation to keep it. No, there is not-at least in Catholic Christian tradition-a right to suicide, since every right is concerned with a good, whether instrumental or consummatory. Yes, revelation does have something to say about the moral responsibility for health. And so on. These are things we are not likely to neglect because very little effort was expended in learning them and because what was learned was minimal, even if important. They are so general in character that we know them down oar pulses as human beings-even though they contain the seeds of some serious moral disputes, as, for example, in the case of euthanasia in some instances.

In what follows I should like to outline some neglected aspects of responsibility for health. Because my purpose is provocative and suggestive, I shall paint with a broad brush. In doing so I shall spare the reader the extensive footnote documentation that could be adduced to support the claims made or extend the probes initiated.

I

In thinking about responsibility for health, one of the first things we are likely to forget is that "health" is both too broad and too narrow a term to convey our over-all responsibilities. Health is a notion defined by its relation to disease. But the term "disease" has had an interesting evolutionary history and therefore so has health.1 "Disease" first meant an identifiable degenerative or inflammatory process which, if unchecked, would lead to serious organic illness and sometimes eventually to death. The next stage of development was statistical-at least some diseases being identified by deviation from a supposed statistical norm. Thus we referred to hyperthyroidism or hypothyroidism, hypercholesterolemia, hypoglycemia, etc. One was said to be unhealthy, to have a disease if he or she were hypo or hyper anything, not in the sense of an existing, tangible degenerative process, but in the sense that the individual was more than others likely to suffer some untoward event, what my colleague Dr. André Hellegers is fond of calling "hyperuntowardeventitis."

1These reflections I owe to Dr. André Hellegers (Charles Sumner Bacon Lecture).

The third notion of disease is inability to function in society. For instance, there is a good deal of surgery being performed to enlarge breasts, to shrink buttocks, to remove wrinkles-in brief, to conform to someone's notion of the attractive and eventually of the tolerable. We live in a society that cannot tolerate aging. At some point, then, this question arises: Who is the patient here, who is sick-the individual, or society? I mean, of course, that this broad understanding of "health" can too easily reflect a sickness of society, in its judgments about the meaning of the person. In our time and in some societies, people are hospitalized because of nonconformity. That suggests that the notion of "health" is becoming increasingly nonsomatized and getting out of control.

The final stage of development is the definition of health popularized by the World Health Organization. Health is a "state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being, not simply the absence of illness and disease." This description of health was adopted in the Doe v. Bolton abortion decision of the U. S. Supreme Court. The Court stated that the "medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient."2 Following this notion of health, the quite preposterous situation could arise where a person's sense of well-being is threatened by the size of his or her car. The appropriate medical judgment would be a prescription for a Chrysler Imperial to replace one's Dodge Dart.

Through the expansion of the notions of health and disease, contemporary medicine is increasingly treating the desires of people in a move toward a discomfortless society. Desires, of course, are notoriously the product of many suspect sources. What we can easily forget, then, is that under this burgeoning notion of health and disease, "moral responsibility for health" can too easily lead to an endorsement of a notion of the person that is highly distorted and at some point radically un-Christian.

On the other hand, the term "health" is far too narrow. If we define and delimit our moral responsibilities under such narrowing, we very easily forget that our responsibilities extend to the living even in their dying. A narrow notion of health as delimiting responsibility can lead us to forget that one of our most urgent moral tasks is care and comfort of the dying. Particular temptations of a highly technological health-care system are to abandon the dying, to approach our responsibilities by narrowing the options to pulling the plug or not pulling the plug. "Orders not to resuscitate" are too often carried out as if they were orders to do nothing—not even care.

2Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,192(1973).

II

The second thing we can easily forget is that health problems are traceable to and root in cultural priorities and the structures that embody these priorities. It is popular now, perhaps even faddish to speak of "sinful structures" in society. What is meant here in a general way, is that enslavement of persons occurs through structures.

            To understand this, we must distinguish two types of structures. The first I refer to as "operational structures." These are zoning laws, welfare systems, tax systems, health-delivery systems, international monetary systems, etc.--the concrete organizational patterns that make up our environment. Since our environment profoundly shapes our lives, these structures can be either liberating or enslaving. They are very often enslaving-and that brings me to the second type of structure, "ideological structures." An ideological structure is nothing more nor less than a corporately adopted priority. An ideological structure becomes enslaving when it makes some value other than individual persons the organizing and dominating value. I say "organizing"-that is, this value produces reciprocal expectations, patterns of action, decisions, policies. I say "dominating"-that is, individuals are subordinated to this value.

            For example, one could argue that American business or economic life is structured around, dominated by, a single value: Make money. The GNP is the index of economic health. The Cadillac is the sign of social status. Boards of trustees are often composed of men of money. Banks have replaced cathedrals as our largest buildings. Our American culture rewards this value in many subtle and nonsubtle ways. This means that other values will be pursued only within this over-all priority. Thus justice in education, housing, medical services, and job opportunity is promoted within the dominance of the financial criterion-"if we can afford it." That means, of course, "if we can achieve it without changing our life-style." In summary, then, when large numbers of people are suffering or are denied their rights and opportunities, look for a value that subordinates them and one that has been made a structure by becoming the organizing force of policies and decisions.

            What we are likely to forget, where responsibility for health is concerned, is that health is deeply affected by the life-style of a culture or nation, a life-style that is the embodiment of certain value priorities. In the United States, our dominant instrumental values are technology, efficiency, and comfort, for these support the "good life" of consumership that is ours. Many of our health problems are directly or at least heavily traceable to this so-called good life. It would be typically American to face these problems with more technology and 'more pain relief, more uppers and downers, better filters on the cigarette. Actually, if we get our heads on straight--that is, if we are truly responsible-what is needed is a change in structures, above all the ideological structures or value priorities involved. For instance, I believe there would be far less smoking and excessive drinking in a society organized differently than ours. Changing value priorities is not easy, for it means changing hearts and minds and outlooks on life. We are likely to forget this when we think of "moral responsibility for health."

 III

Another aspect of moral responsibility for health that must concern us is that which gathers around the notion of public morality. By that term I do not mean public participation in the directions and priorities of medical practice, getting representatives of the public on committees and decision-making bodies. Nor do I mean simply the law. Since one acid test of law is feasibility, reducing public morality to the law could all too easily collapse it into the utterly pragmatic considerations that so often decide what is feasible.

Public morality is something quite different. I would outline the notion by highlighting the fact that health-care delivery is increasingly mediated very heavily by institutions. We have group practice, insurance coverage, medication controlled by the FDA, Medicare, Medicaid, etc., hospitals built by government, and research supported and controlled by its agencies. Groups, it must he noticed (whether hospitals, companies, or governments), have interests and concerns other than the immediate good of the patient. For instance, the federal government has a legitimate interest in population control; reducing the welfare rolls; control of illegitimate parenthood; advance of diagnostic, therapeutic, and preventive medicine; protection of life.

All of this suggests that whenever other values are the legitimate concern of the mediators of health care, the good of the patient can easily become one of several values, in competition for attention and priority. This means that the individual is in danger of being subordinated to these values. Public morality is precisely the pursuit of these other values without violating individual rights. Or stated differently, it is harmonizing public concerns with individual needs and rights--the pursuit of these other public values while keeping the good of the individual primary.

When the biomedical enterprise is mediated by groups with other legitimate concerns, the danger of mistreatment of the individual is real. The ones who are likely to suffer most are the poor, the dependent (the elderly, retarded, prisoners), and the "ordinary" patient who is neglected in favor of exquisite technological virtuosities that consume disproportionate energies, time, and funds. We are likely to forget that moral responsibility for health means keeping a sharp eye on the harmonization of public concerns with the needs of individuals, on public morality-so that the "1ittle people" are not short-suited.

 IV

The fourth dimension of responsibility for health care that is easy to forget is directly attributable to the technological and impersonal aspect of health care, especially in its hugeness. When sickness calls for hospitalization, one is often ushered into a vast system. Certain symptomatic conditions call for certain responses. Certain turns of events dictate still other responses. Medical and paramedical personnel are trained to respond swiftly, efficiently, and in standard or orthodox ways to certain phenomena. Gradually, if imperceptibly, the impression grows that "we (the medical system) are responsible for them," that the medical system makes the decisions about treatment--and eventually that it is necessary to subtract ourselves from systematic or institutional treatment decisions by legislating living wills.

I realize that it is possible to caricature here. But I am trying to paint a picture of health-care delivery in our society that has tended to create and reinforce the impression that it is the attending physician who makes the decision to treat or not to treat. The Karen Ann Quinlan case is a dramatic and symbolic example of this mislocation of the onus of decision-making. In that case, the Quinlan family sought to subtract their daughter from the jurisdiction of her physicians. The way events developed in that case, the presumptions seem to be that physicians have a right to treat a patient unasked-indeed, opposed. This premise is wrong in itself and dangerous in its implications-and responsibility for health demands that we be clear on these points.

It is wrong in itself because the individual, having the prime obligation for his own health care, has also thereby the right to the necessary means for such basic health care--specifically, the right of self-determination in the acceptance or rejection of treatment. When an individual puts himself into a doctor's hands, he engages the doctor's services; he does not abdicate his right to decide his own fate. Patients retain the right to refuse a physician's advice, however ill advised the patients might be in doing so.

Furthermore, this subtle shift in the doctor-patient relationship is threatening in its value implications, for in lessening the patients' rights, it will tend to blunt those perspectives that are intended to inform the exercise of those rights. The Judaeo-Christian tradition maintains that there are values more important than life in the living of it. So it also holds that there are values more important than life in the dying of it. For this reason the accumulation of minutes of life is not the moral guideline by which dying must be done. For instance, the justification for administration of painkilling drugs, even if they should shorten life, recognizes that there is a value in being free, which permits the pursuit of other values, such as prayer.

            What I fear is that a system that increasingly reinforces the notion of physician mastery over patients will at the same time undermine those altogether balanced perspectives within which patient choice ought to occur, for the very notion that a dying patient has a moral choice as to how he will live while dying is an outgrowth of these basic perspectives. A system that undermines that choice attacks, however subtly, the perspectives that generated it. To forget this is to fail in moral responsibility for health care.

 V

Another aspect of responsibility for health that we are likely to forget is the possible implication of quality-of-life judgments. Much of contemporary health care and very many decisions about treatment are concerned with not just the preservation of life and avoidance of disease, but also with a certain quality of life. This is absolutely as it should be. Thus we are concerned not just with keeping a patient alive by surgery or medication, but with a certain level of being alive, a certain acceptable mix of freedom, painlessness, and ability to function. Problems like this are particularly acute and anguishing where resuscitation is in question. Sissela Bok, composing a possible living will in the New England Journal of Medicine, has put into words what most of us feel about the technological potential of modern medicine:

I wish to live a full and long life, but not at all costs. If my death is near and cannot be avoided, and if I have lost the ability to interrelate with others and have no reasonable chance of regaining this ability, or if my suffering is intense and irreversible, I do not want to have my life prolonged. I would then ask not to be subjected to surgery or resuscitation. Nor would I then wish to have life support from mechanical ventilators, intensive-care services, or other life-prolonging procedures, including the administration of antibiotics and blood products. I would wish, rather, to have care which gives comfort and support, which facilitates my interaction with others to the extent that this is possible, and which brings peace.3

3Sissela Bok, "Personal Directions for Care at the End of Life," New England Journal of Medicine, 295(1976), 369.

I believe that most of us would agree with that and hope that we are treated in line with the value mix expressed so well by Bok.

            However, what we are likely to forget is that the extension of such a mix backward to the incompetent child or baby is not quite as easy. We are likely to forget in making such quality-of-life judgments about the newborn that we can be discriminatory and be exercising a racism of the adult world. Extrapolation backward to babies of the criteria we might use for Karen Ann Quinlan--and use reasonably, in my judgment--has these characteristics. First, it is extremely difficult for an adult to draw the line at the right place, because in attempting to do so, that adult would una-

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